The relative value of effort expressed in terms of nbsp

The last 50 years have seen a spectacular increase in fishing capacity, and interestingly enough, the money and effort dedicated to increase fishing pressure have only succeeded in slowing the decline in landings while the CPUE (and perhaps profitability) (Sumaila et al., 2008) plummeted starting as early as in the 1960s. Although individual fleets are driven by profit which defines their choice in target ONX0912  and fishing grounds (Sethi et al., 2010), it is also true that they have not been submitted to the full rigour of profitability in pursuing fishing activities as important subsidies have artificially maintained fleets and encouraged increase in fishing effort and fishing power (Mesnil, 2008; Sumaila et al., 2008; Villasante, 2010).
The current fisheries management is polysaccharides influenced by an irresistible temptation to stretch the limits and ignore management rules to avoid yet another impending fisheries crisis (see Mesnil, 2008). The incentives to ask for exemptions have been numerous and justified by an imminent crisis every time. In 2008 for instance, after fishermen protests, the French government requested an increase in the Celtic cod quota, arguing an unexpected recruitment, higher than the mean recruitment used in stock projections. The quota was increased in spite of the negative advice from the STCEF (Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries, European Commission).